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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MAX R. CARTER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
MILFORD VALLEY MEMORIAL 
HOSPITAL, a government agency of 
BEAVER COUNTY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Civil No. 990203-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The jurisdiction of the Court is established by Sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j)5 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Appellant has framed the issue as follows: "Were the employees/agents of Defendant 
who performed automotive mechanical maintenance, repairs and/or replacement of an 
ambulance, health care providers under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act?" However, 
the issue, as noted below, does not concern the act of an automotive mechanic, but the 
actions of employees/agents of Defendant in transferring the decedent to another ambulance. 
Therefore the issue is: "Were the employees/agents of Defendant who determined to transfer 
the decedent to a new ambulance after experiencing potential malfunctions, health care 
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providers and/or employees of health care providers under the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act?" 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for reviewing a summary judgment is correctness. "Because 
'a challenge to summary judgment presents only a question of law,' we review it for 
correctness." Rvan v. Dan's Food Stores. Inc.. 972 P.2d 395,400 (Utah 1998)(quoting West 
v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994)). That court continued: "In 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, '[w]e determine only whether the trial court erred 
in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no 
disputed issues of material of fact.'" Ryan, at 400 (quoting Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 
151 (Utah 1989)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-14-2(1999) is set forth verbatim in part herein and is 
found in the addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3 (1999) is set forth verbatim in part herein and is 
found in the addendum to Appellant's Brief. 
3. UTAHCODEANN. § 78-14-4 (1999) is set forth in the addendum to Appellant's 
Brief. 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-8 (1999) is referred to herein and is found in the 
attached addendum. 
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5. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2 (1999) is set forth verbatim in part herein and is 
found in the attached addendum. 
6. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (1999) is set forth verbatim in part herein and is 
found in the attached addendum. 
7. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (1999) is set forth verbatim in part herein and 
is found in the attached addendum. 
8. UTAH CODE ANN.-§ 78-11-7 (1999) is referred to herein and is found in the 
attached addendum. 
9. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(2) (1999) is referred to herein and is found in 
the attached addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the present case, Plaintiff/Appellant brought an action against the Hospital Service 
District/Appellee for the alleged wrongful death of his spouse. This appeal is from the 
summary judgment entered by the Fifth District Court of Beaver County, State of Utah, on 
February 2, 1999. The District Court ruled that the Hospital Service District is a health care 
provider, and the actions complained of related to the transportation of the decedent by the 
ambulance service provided by the Defendant. As this ambulance service falls under the 
health care provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-1 
et seq. (1999), the two year statute of limitations barred the claims of the Appellant, because 
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he failed to comply with mandates of this Act by filing the appropriate notice within the 
required period of time and by not filing suit within the two year required period. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts were determined by the District Court to be undisputed as that court found 
that the Appellant had failed "to provide any such 'concise statement of material facts as to 
which [it] contends a genuine issue exists.5 Nor does he 'specifically refer' to any portion 
of the record to demonstrate disputed issues of fact." Memorandum Decision at 2, attached 
to addendum of Appellant's Brief. The Court adopted the facts of the Appellee and 
summarized the facts as they are related below. 
On October 8, 1995, the decedent became ill. Her husband, the Appellant, called for 
emergency assistance from the Appellee hospital. An ambulance was dispatched, and the 
decedent was placed aboard. The ambulance departed for the Beaver Valley Hospital. See 
Memorandum Decision at 2-3. 
In his brief, the Appellant contends that the ambulance broke down en route. 
However, as noted above, no disputed fact was presented at the trial court level supporting 
this contention. The undisputed facts indicate that a gauge within the ambulance began to 
operate "erratically." A second ambulance was dispatched which met the first en route. 
When both ambulances met, the decedent was transferred to the second ambulance, which 
took a minute or two. The decedent died nine days later on October 17, 1995. See 
Memorandum Decision at 2-3. 
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Over two years later, the Appellant filed the present claim, alleging that the 
Appellee's negligence in the care of its ambulance caused the decedent's delayed arrival at 
the Beaver Valley Hospital and therefore caused her wrongful death. See Memorandum 
Decision at 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The facts of the case were not disputed by the Appellant, and the district court 
properly adopted the facts of th& Appellee. Therefore, in accordance with Supreme Court 
precedent, the review of the District Court's decision is one of correctness. See Shurtz v. 
BMW of North America. 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). The undisputed facts indicate 
that action complained of by the Appellant occurred while health care was being rendered 
to the decedent by the ambulance service of the Appellee Hospital. Section 78-14-3(11) of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("Act") defines health care providers and the statute 
clearly encompasses the ambulance service. Interpretation of this statute by the Supreme 
Court, and statutory construction principles defined by that court further demonstrate that the 
health care provided in the present case fell within statutes parameters. 
An ambulance service, standing alone is also part of the health care service envisioned 
in the Act. This service provides services similar to other care providers. Further, the 
ambulance service is an integral part of the health care provided by the hospital. 
Appellant contends that a mechanic is not a health care provider, and therefore this 
case was wrongly decided. However, the statutory language and the accompanying 
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legislative history indicate that employees of health care providers fall within the language 
of the Act. Therefore, the actions of an employee relating to health care carried out in the 
course of employment fall within the requirements of the Act, specifically that any action 
brought against a health care provider must be brought within the two year statute of 
limitations found in § 78-14-4. 
The acts of a health care employee, though not a direct rendering of health care, give 
rise to claims under § 78-14-3(14). The Act encompasses all claims "based upon alleged 
personal injuries." Again, legislative intent and established principles of statutory 
construction indicate that the actions taken in the maintenance of the ambulance do relate to 
health care. Further, the argument presented by the Appellant would create a gap in the Act, 
frustrating its purpose. Also, Appellant's interpretation of the Act creates contradictions in 
effect of the Act, which is contrary to the rules of statutory construction. The Act was 
proposed to limit the time for claims against health care providers, not shield them from 
claims. Appellant's argument attempts to create a new interpretation of the Act, because the 
claim was not properly brought in accordance with the Act's statute of limitations. 
Appellee presented two other grounds for summary judgment in the district court. 
Although that court did not reach these grounds, the district courts grant of summary 
judgment may also be affirmed on either of these two grounds. See Nova Casualty Co. v. 
Able Construction. Inc., 374 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1999). 
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The first of these grounds is that the Appellant's claims are barred by the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. The Appellee is a hospital organized as a political body 
created as a hospital service district. As such it is immune from certain claims including 
those arising out of the operation of an emergency vehicle and for failure to make a proper 
inspection of the ambulance. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-10(4) and (15) (1999). 
The final argument is that Appellant's claim is barred by the two-year general statute 
of limitations for wrongful death actions as contained in § 78-12-28(2). The more specific 
statute of limitations should apply as provided by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
However, Appellant also failed to comply with § 78-12-28(2) by failing to file the present 
suit within two years of the death of the decedent. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Ambulance Service Is an Integral Part of the Defendant and Is a 
Health Care Provider as Provided by the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act. 
Appellant contends that the actions complained of were caused by the negligence oi 
an "auto mechanic," who is not covered by the provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act as defined in § 78-14-3 of the Utah Code. However, the undisputed facts 
indicate that no action by a mechanic was involved in this case. Appellant alleged a 
mechanical failure of the ambulance, causing a twenty minute delay. However, as noted 
above, and by undisputed the facts on the record, this was not the case. 
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The ambulance transportation did experience a delay of one or two minutes when 
those on board the ambulance rendering health care to the decedent, determined to call for 
a second ambulance as a precautionary measure. Their ambulance, at no point, actually 
suffered a mechanical breakdown. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2, % 7, attached hereto in the addendum. As noted in the Memorandum 
Decision, Appellant failed to produce any disputed facts and the Court admitted Appellee's 
facts for the Motion for Summary Judgment. See Memorandum Decision at 2. Therefore, 
the undisputed facts demonstrated that the decision to transfer the decedent was made by the 
driver of the ambulance in conjunction with his duties in rendering health care to promote 
the health care of the decedent. Again, as the facts are not in dispute the decision of the 
district court is reviewed only for correctness. See Utah Bankers Association v. America 
First Credit Union. 912 P.2d 988, 990-991 (Utah 1996); see also Shurtz v. BMW of North 
America, 814 P.2d 1108,1111 (Utah 1991) ("[A] challenge to a summary judgment presents 
for review only conclusions of law because by definition, cases decided on summary 
judgment do not resolve factual issues.") 
This ambulance service is a "health care provider" as defined by the act. Section 78-
14-3(11) of the Utah Code provides that a hospital is one such defined health care provider: 
"Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, 
association, corporation, or other facility or institution who 
causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional 
services as a hospital, physician, registered nurse, licensed 
practical nurse, nurse-midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, 
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optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, 
physical therapist, podiatric physician, psychologist, 
chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic 
physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, 
speech-language pathologist, clinical social worker, certified 
social worker, social service worker, marriage and family 
counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar 
care and services relating to or arising out of the health needs of 
persons or groups of persons and officers, employees, or agents 
of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their 
employment. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(11) (1999). It is undisputed the Appellee is a hospital. The 
District Court not only noted that the Appellee "is [] licensed as a 'General Acute Hospital,'" 
but further stated in accordance with the above cited language that the Appellee "easily 
qualifies as a health care provider for the purposes of the Malpractice Act. The [Appellee] 
is a hospital which renders health care and related professional services." Memorandum 
Decision at 3-4. The Court further noted that the "[transportation of persons in need of 
health care to the hospital is obviously an integral part of the hospital function and is part of 
the health care provided by the [Appellee]. Indeed, the health care service which the 
[Appellee] provided through its ambulance is the very issue in this case." Id at 4-5. 
The District Court correctly made this decision based on current law. Utah Code § 
78-14-3(11) was recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Platts v. Parents Helping 
Parents. 947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997). In that case, the parent of a child who committed suicide 
while under the care of defendant brought an action against the defendant, Parents Helping 
Parents. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendant holding that the 
9 
defendant was a health care provider. Because it was a health care provider, the statute of 
limitations found in § 78-14-4 was applicable to their case, and therefore the claim was time 
barred. The parents appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals, in their decision, stated the general rule of statutory 
interpretation. The court cited the purpose of the Act is such that courts should look to 
congressional intent. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 897 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). That court concluded: 
We construe § 78-14-3(11) narrowly to cover only those 
specifically identified as "health care providers" or those in the 
rare cases who are so similar to those listed as to have little 
doubt as to their intended "health care provider" status. 
Id. at 1232. The Court of Appeals then held as a matter of law the defendant, a "day 
treatment facility," was not a health care provider because their titles were not among those 
listed in § 78-14-3(11), nor were their titles sufficiently similar to them. See id. 
The Supreme Court reversed this decision on certiorari, thereby rejecting a narrow 
interpretation of § 78-14-3(11) and holding that Parents Helping Parents was one of those 
encompassed under the "others rendering care and services similar." See Platts, 947 P.2d 
658 (Utah 1997). It should also be noted that the Supreme Court restated the rules of 
statutory interpretation: 
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of the 
true intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting [an] Act is 
the plain language of the Act." Jensen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). "[Statutory 
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enactments are to be construed as to render all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful." Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 
P.2d 934,936 (Utah 1980). Likewise, we are compelled to give 
the statutory language meaning and to assume that "each term 
in the statute was used advisedly . . . unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage Indus., Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n., 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991)(footnote 
omitted). We will avoid an interpretation which renders 
portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative. 
State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995). 
Id at 662. 
The Supreme Court further: stated that § 78-14-3(11) "is not ambiguous . . ." and 
"[t]he judiciary is obligated to interpret statues as they are crafted..." Id at 662. The court 
stated that Court of Appeals erred in excluding the defendant because their license was 
obtained under a section not listed in the statute. The court stated that this would exclude all 
those who may perform similar care or services. The court stated: 
We conclude that the statute in question means what it says. All 
those identified in the statute are "health care providers." All 
others rendering care and services similar to those explicitly 
identified are also "health care providers." 
Id. at 663. A much stronger argument applies in the case at bar where the ambulance 
services is directly addressing the patients health care needs. 
For the reasons stated above, the District Court properly and correctly interpreted the 
statute. The Appellee is a hospital of which the ambulance service was an integral part. The 
District Court correctly noted that an ambulance service is directly related to the health care 
provided by the Appellee. Therefore, the Appellee is a health care provider because it is 
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specifically listed as a hospital and its integral parts, such as the ambulance service, provide 
"care and services to those explicitly identified." 
B. The Ambulance Service, Apart from the Hospital Is Still a Health Care 
Provider as Provided by the Act. 
Even if the ambulance driver was not a listed health care provider, his services, as 
stated by the Platts decision were related to health care as he was "rendering care and 
services similar to those explicitly identified are also 'health care providers.'" Id at 663. 
As noted by the above citation to the Utah Code, "others rendering similar care and services 
relating to or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons" are also health 
care providers. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(11). As the District Court Judge noted, 
ambulance transportation is an integral part of the services rendered. Therefore, the 
conclusions of the District Court Judge that the ambulance service was a health care provider 
was correct, and this position is supported by the language in Platts. 
C. The Appellant's Claim Is Still Barred by the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act Because an Ambulance Mechanic Would Still Be 
Covered by the Provisions of the Act. 
Although the facts do not indicate that a mechanical decision was made at any time 
during the proceedings, Appellant contends that the negligence claim was based upon an 
"auto mechanic's" negligent care of the ambulance. While there was no such evidence 
before the trial court, Appellant bases his argument on allegations made in his complaint, 
which were not presented on summary judgment. At no point does the Appellant dispute the 
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District Court's analysis that the ambulance service is an integral part of the health care 
provided by the Appellee. Nor did Appellant contend in his facts that a particular mechanic 
was liable, but suggested only in his argument opposing summary judgment that someone 
other than the hospital may have been responsible. However, assuming that the ambulance 
driver or the mechanic were not rendering direct health care to the decedent, the providing 
of their services is still encompassed by the Act. 
Section 78-14-3(11), states in part, that a health care provider is any one of those 
several titles listed, including the hospital as noted above. It also includes "officer, 
employees, or agents of the any of the above (including hospitals) acting in the course and 
scope of their employment" UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-3(11) (1999). As is correctly noted 
by the Appellant, an auto mechanic is not a listed health care provider. However, even if the 
question as to whether the mechanic was the negligent or cause of the negligence in the 
present case, the maintenance of the ambulance would still fall within the scope of their 
employment as that employment aided the hospital in its role as a health care provider. 
Therefore, the District Court properly concluded that the ambulance transportation was still 
covered by the principles of the Act. When the two year statute of limitations had run, 
Appellant's claim was barred as the ambulance mechanic was acting within the scope of his 
duties, which included rendering health care to another. Again, the Platts court determined 
that "the statute in question means what it says," explicitly identifying that all others 
rendering similar aid fell within the provisions of the Act. Platts, at 663. The same argument 
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applies in the present case. The citation from the Utah Code cited above immediately 
follows all those who render similar care. Therefore, the plain language of the Act 
encompasses all those working within the scope of their employment in the areas of health 
care. Claims against those who act within the scope of their employment on behalf of the 
health care providers, are barred by § 78-14-4fs two year statute of limitations. 
However, it should be noted that this final argument need not be reached by this 
Court. As noted above in subpart A, the District Court properly concluded that the 
ambulance transportation was an integral part of the hospital. The hospital itself is clearly 
an identified health care provider. Therefore, the hospital may not be subject to suit after the 
two years statute of limitations has expired. Further, as indicated in subpart B above, the 
District Court in this same conclusion stated that the transportation is an integral part of the 
hospital, and the driver and the ambulance providing transportation to the hospital were 
clearly part of the health care rendered. This conclusion is based properly on the status of 
the law as interpretated by Platts. Further, the lower court did not explicitly reach the 
decision that a mechanic was covered by the health care provision, as the Appellant raised 
no issues of fact supporting this contention. However, the above argument indicates that 
while acting in the scope of his employment, he also falls under the provisions of the Act. 
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D. The Action of which the Appellant Complains Clearly Relates to the 
Health Care Provided. 
In Point Two of the Appellant's argument, the Appellant states "that the maintenance 
and repair of an ambulance by an auto mechanic is in no way related to or arising from 
'health care.'" Appellant's Brief at 7. Appellant relies on § 78-14-3(14) of the Utah Code 
which defines a malpractice action. 
"Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider whether in contract, tort, 
breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon 
alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of the health 
care rendered or which should have been rendered by the health 
care provider. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (1999) (emphasis added). 
However, Appellant's contention fails for three reasons. First, as stated by the District 
Court, the health care provided by the Appellee hospital is an "integral part" of their health 
care services and therefore "relates to" health care. Second, Appellant's interpretation of this 
section, contradicts the intent of the legislature and contradicts the accepted language of § 
78-14-3(11) cited above. Third, Appellant's interpretation will lead to absurd results creating 
a gap in the Act, thereby frustrating legislative intent and making the language within the Act 
superfluous. 
The District Court specifically noted, as stated above, that the "[transportation of 
persons in need of health care to the hospital is obviously an integral part of the hospital 
function as part of the health care provided by the [Appellee]." Memorandum Decision at 
15 
4-5. Again, the statutory language states that an action "relating to . . . health care rendered 
or which should have been rendered by the health care provider." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
14-3(14) (1999). Appellee rendered transport services to the hospital, the sole purpose of this 
transport was to expedite the "health care" of the person being transported. Therefore, if a 
failure occurs in the transport, then by logical conclusion, a failure occurs in the health care 
being rendered. 
Additionally, the last portion of this statute relates to health care which "which should 
have been rendered." Assuming the facts to be true as stated above, then the Appellee 
Hospital should have rendered health care with its ambulance services, which were stopped 
in this case for a minute or two to make the transfer. 
For these reasons, the ambulance transportation itself, as well as the service of the 
particular ambulance in this case, falls within the language § 78-14-3(14). Again, the Platts 
court stated that "the statute... means what it says." Platts, 947 at 663. The ambulance care 
related and arose from the health care being provided to the decedent, even if a mechanic 
failed to properly monitor a gauge located on the ambulance. The interpretation of the above 
statute by the Appellant also contradicts the intent of the legislature and the accepted 
language of § 78-14-3(11), which is cited above. The Utah Legislature stated that: 
In enacting this Act, it is the purpose of the legislature to 
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while limiting that time to a 
specified period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to 
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provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-2 (1999). 
In the present case the Appellee Hospital is clearly a health care provider, and as noted 
above, the employees and other services which relate to the provision of health care fall 
within the statutory scheme. If in every situation where the hospital or other health care 
provider had to justify how every act fell within the contemplation of the provision of health 
care the purposes of the statute would be frustrated. In the present case the Appellant 
brought the action over two years later and now is attempting to justify the lateness of his 
claim by basing it on an argument that the care provided by an ambulance does not fall 
within the health care provided. However, as noted above, both subsections (11) and (14) 
encompass any claim relating to or arising from the health care including the ambulance 
services in this case. 
Further, Appellant's interpretation of § 78-14-3(14) would specifically contradict the 
language cited above from subsection (11), which stated any "officers, employees, or agents 
of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment." The ambulance 
system's sole existence is to provide transport to those needing health care, and assuming 
arguendo that the auto mechanic would be responsible for the maintenance of care of this 
ambulance, subsection (11) clearly encompasses that mechanic. This is supported by the 
argument above. However, according to the interpretation of subsection (14) by the 
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Appellant, the employees of a hospital or other health care provider would be removed if the 
specific action they took did not directly relate to the specific injury. As noted in the present 
case, the facts are that the Appellant called for the ambulance which was dispatched as part 
of the health care service. Therefore again, any failure of the ambulance was a failure in the 
health care service provided. Therefore, under the language of the statute the claim is barred 
by the statute of limitations. "The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the 
legislature in enacting the act is~the plain language of the act." Boulder Mountain Lodge. 
Inc. v. Town of Boulder, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (1999) (quoting State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 
311,313 (Utah 1995)). That court went on to state: "accordingly, we 'look first to the plain 
language of the statute and assume that each of the terms was used advisably. The language 
is therefore read literally unless such a reading proves to be unreasonably confused or 
inoperable.'" Boulder Mountain Lodge, at 7 fquoting Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith. 892 P.2d 
1, 3 (Utah 1995)). In Boulder Mountain Lodge the court stated with regard to a liquor 
license statute that: "the statutory language requiring the written consent of local authority 
. . . is exceedingly plain on its face." Therefore, based on the plain language of this statute 
stating "any" claim arising from health care is covered, and this is one such claim 
The Platts court farther stated "we will avoid an interpretation which renders portions 
of, or words in, a statute superfluous or inoperative." Platts. at 662 (quoting State v. Hunt. 
906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995)). Accepting the interpretation by the Appellant in this case 
would render the language in subsection (11) superfluous. That section, as noted repeatedly 
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above, indicates that employees working in the scope of their employment for one of the 
identified health care providers fall within the purview of the Act. Therefore, subsection 
(14), if granted the interpretation by the Appellant, would have those persons removed if the 
specific act of employment was not within the listed health care fields. The result is a 
hospital employee is covered within the definition of (11), but removed by (14) under the 
Appellant's interpretation if his job title is not on the list of other healthcare professional or 
standing alone is not so similarly-related. The health care provided by the ambulance in this 
case was related. However, assuming that the auto mechanic was negligent in his care of the 
ambulance, his actions would be covered under subsection (11), but according to the 
Appellant not covered under subsection (14). If his actions are not covered under subsection 
(14), the language of the act is superfluous in that no employee ever acting within the scope 
of their employment would be covered unless he also met the first part of part of the 
definition. However, if he is an employee acting within the scope of his employment, 
subsection (14) is still viable in that his employment related to the health care being 
provided. Therefore, the interpretation adopted by the District Court and that supported by 
the Appellee in this case renders both subsections operable and is within the cited intent of 
the legislature. "[Statutory enactments are to be construed as to render all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful." Platts. at 662 (quoting Millet v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 
936 (Utah 1980)). 
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The Appellant' s interpretation would also lead to absurd results and thereby frustrates 
legislative intent. As noted above, the legislative intent is to place a time limit on all actions 
brought against health care providers. As noted by the interpretation by the Platts court, as 
well as the arguments above, this definition is broad enough to cover all actions relating to 
or arising from health care, again, the above cited language from the act states that any action 
may fall within the definition, including torts, contracts, etc. The purpose of the Act was to 
lower costs for insurance and other costs provided by health care providers. The actions 
complained of in this case and similar cases result in costs to the health care providers. 
These are the costs that the health care provider was meant to avoid after the period of statute 
of limitations had run, according to the purpose of the statute as cited above. 
Further, though not implicated in this present case, the interpretation by the Appellant 
would open a gap in the law. His interpretation would require the courts to analyze every 
specific act taken by any employee of any health care provider which does not directly relate 
to the health care of that particular person. It is true that a mechanic does not perform a 
"health care service." However, his service is related and arises from the need for health 
care. 
A few examples demonstrate the gap that would be created by the argument made by 
the Appellant. First, an elevator failure in a hospital may result in a patient having to be 
moved between floors by stairs. This would result in delay of the health care being provided 
to them. That situation is very similar to the present case. It would be absurd for a claimant 
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to wait over two years to bring an action simply because an elevator operator or elevator 
mechanic failed to properly inspect or otherwise maintain the elevators. Clearly the hospital 
in that situation bears the responsibility of all provisions of its health care, including that of 
the maintenance of the elevator. Therefore, the two year statute of limitations should apply. 
Another example is that of a cafeteria employee. A patient staying at a hospital may 
require a certain diet. A cafeteria worker is clearly not a "health care provider." However, 
failure on her part to properly monitor the ingredients in a food item may interrupt or 
interfere with recovery, or even cause physical injuries to the patient. In such a situation, a 
claimant may state that the cafeteria worker was not providing health care. However, clearly 
the dietary needs of the patients arise from and relate to the health care provided to that 
patient by the hospital. Similarly in the present case, as noted above and by the District 
Court, the health care provided was an "integral part" of the health care provided by the 
Appellee hospital. Again, all of Appellant's contentions and arguments could have been 
addressed by simply complying with the mandates of the Act by filing the appropriate notice 
within the required period of time. 
E. The Trial Court's Decision Should Also Be Affirmed in Accordance With 
The Governmental Immunity Act And Because Appellant Failed to Make 
His Claim Within the Statute of Limitations for a Wrongful Death Action 
Appellee made its motion for summary judgment on three grounds. As noted above, 
the lower court did not "reach the separate issues governmental immunity, or the 
applicability of the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions." Memorandum 
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Decision at 5. However, these two other grounds also serve as a proper basis for this court 
to affirm the judgment of the lower court in accordance with the holding of Nova Casualty 
Co. v. Able Construction. Inc., 374 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1999). 
In Nova, the appellee similarly argued that the trial court had properly affirmed its 
motion for summary judgment, but that the trial court could have affirmed this decision on 
other grounds which the trial court rejected. The appellant, Able Construction, argued that 
Nova had to raise these issues through a cross-appeal. The Supreme disagreed stating: "If 
they [Nova] wish to uphold the trial court's ruling on grounds that were raised but rejected 
below, a cross appeal is not necessary." IdL at 3. The Supreme Court continued: "Nova does 
not request any change in relief. It was granted summary judgment, and it asks only that the 
decision of the trial court be affirmed. Therefore, it is free to raise arguments, not accepted 
below, in support of the ruling." Id. at 4. 
In the present case, the Appellee raised two other arguments in support of its motion 
for summary judgment. The trial court did not consider these as it found the first to be 
dispositive. Similar to Nova, the Appellee is not seeking to enlarge its rights, but 
demonstrate that the trial court's decision should be affirmed. Therefore, Appellee raises the 
two other arguments not reached by the trial court, which are supported below. 
1. Appellant's Claims are Barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
Section 63-30-3(1) states in part that "all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a . . . governmentally owned hospital. . . 
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or other governmental health care facility " UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3(1). The term 
"government entity" is defined in § 63-30-2(3) as "the state and its political subdivisions as 
defined in this chapter." Section 63-30-2(7) defines a "political subdivision" as "any county, 
city, town . . . or other governmental subdivision or public corporation." The Appellee 
Hospital is a public division of Beaver County, State of Utah. See Memorandum Decision 
at 3; Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment at 1-2. Since Appellee meets the 
definition of a governmental entity, and since it is governmentally owned, the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Acts applies to this case. 
Appellant's specific claims are barred by §§ 63-30-10(15) and 63-30-10(4). Section 
63-30-10 states that no waiver of immunity exists where "the injury arises out of, in 
connection with or results from . . . (15) the operation of an emergency vehicle" while the 
emergency vehicle is being driven within the parameters of § 41-6-14 (traffic laws 
exceptions for emergency vehicles). Therefore, under § 63-30-10(15) the state has not 
waived sovereign immunity in cases where a claim for relief is based on injuries resulting 
from the use of emergency vehicles unless it can be shown that they were guilty of some 
traffic violation as outlined in § 41-6-14. In his Complaint, Appellant alleged that "[t]he 
death of the decedent was a direct and proximate result of the delay in transporting her to the 
Beaver Valley Hospital." Complaint at 2, attached hereto in the addendum. This, Appellant 
claims, was the result of unnecessary negligent delay caused by Appellee's "[fjailure to keep 
the ambulance in proper maintenance [sic] and repair so that it could complete the trip to 
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Beaver Valley Hospital." Complaint at 3. Appellant does not claim that Appellee violated 
any traffic laws outlined in § 41-6-14. The Utah Supreme Court upheld that validity of this 
section as is noted in Day v. Utah Dept. of Safety. 882 P.2d 1150, 1152 fn.l (Utah App. 
1994). 
In his Memorandum in opposing summary judgment, Appellant argued that 
governmental immunity has been waived under § 63-30-10(15) because the Appellant did 
not claim that the decedent's injuries arose from the "operation of an emergency vehicle," 
but instead arose because of "improper care and maintenance of the ambulance." Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 4. However, an analysis of § 63-30-10 
reveals that governmental immunity has not been waived. 
Section 63-30-10 states that "immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by negligent acts or omissions of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except. . . in connection with . . . (15) the 
operation of an emergency vehicle. . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (emphasis added). 
The death of the decedent does not have to arise from or result from the operation of an 
emergency vehicle in order to maintain governmental immunity, but it is sufficient that the 
injuries are somehow connected to the operation of an emergency vehicle. It is clear that the 
Appellant attributes the alleged injuries directly to the operation of the ambulance. 
Therefore, governmental immunity has not been waived, and the Appellant's claims should 
be barred under § 63-30-3. Once again, "[t]he best evidence of the true intent and purpose 
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of the legislature in enacting [an] Act is the plain language of the Act." Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). 
Appellant's claims are also barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act under § 
63-30-10(4). As noted above, § 63-30-10 states that governmental immunity is generally 
waived. However, an exception is made in § 63-30-10(4) where the claim results from an 
employee's "failure to make an inspection or . . . making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection." In the present case the Appellant argues (though as noted above did not argue 
at the trial level) that the delay was caused by the negligence of an "auto mechanic" who 
failed to properly maintain the ambulance. If such is the case, the failure to properly inspect 
the ambulance falls within the parameters of this statute. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the policy behind the exceptions to the waiver of immunity that are found in § 63-30-10 
are based upon public interest: "Far more persons would suffer if government did not 
perform these functions than would be benefitted by permitting recovery in cases where the 
government is shown to have performed inadequately." Erickson v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 
858 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah 1993) (quoting 4 California Law Revision Commission, Reports, 
Recommendations and Studies 817-18 (1963)). That court held that § 63-30-10(4) "was 
intended to immunize only the conclusions and results of an inspection where the inspector 
may have overlooked something or made faulty judgment in deciding whether to approve or 
reject the subject of the inspection." Erickson. at 998. Appellant's claim that decedent's 
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death was caused by the faulty inspection by an auto mechanic is therefore barred by 
§ 63-30-10(4). 
2. Appellant's Claims Under the General Statute of Limitations for 
Wrongful Death Actions Are Barred By Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(2) 
and § 78-11-7. 
Although the statute allowing for a wrongful death action is found in § 78-11-7, any 
such suit "caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another" falls under the two year statute 
of limitations found in § 78-12-28(2). See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(2) (1999). In a 
recent Supreme Court case, factually similar to the present case, the Court held that the two 
year statute of limitations as set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was applicable 
to an action against a health care provider rather than the general two year statute of 
limitations: "Clearly, the legislature intended that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
apply to actions for wrongful death based upon injuries arising out of medical malpractice." 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.. 944 P.2d 327,332 (Utah 1997). Even if the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act did not apply the action is still barred by this statute of limitations as the 
action is a wrongful death action as the Appellant did not timely file this action during the 
two year time period. 
However, as Appellant argued in his Memorandum opposing summary judgment the 
two tear statute of limitations for wrongful death actions is superceded by the statue of 
limitations in Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (§ 78-14-4). Plaintiffs argument is correct, 
but misplaced. Plaintiff argues on the one hand that the general statute of limitations for 
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wrongful death actions did not apply as § 78-14-4's general statute of limitations does apply. 
Then Appellant argues, as noted above, that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does not 
apply as the claim was not for medical malpractice. See Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment at 2-3. Therefore, if the Court finds that the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act does not apply, then the governing statute of limitations for wrongful 
death actions must be § 78-12-28(2), with which the Appellant did not comply as he filed suit 
over two years after the death of the decedent. However, as stated above, if the Court holds 
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act does apply, then the statute of limitations of that 
Act apply and the Appellant's claims are barred as he failed to comply with requirements of 
§ 78-14-4 or the intent to sue provisions of § 78-14-8. Therefore, as the Appellant failed to 
comply with the requirements of either statute, the decision of the district court granting 
summary judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the District Court should be 
affirmed. The District Court found that there were no disputed material facts as to the issues 
involving the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The Appellant has raised no contention that 
there were disputed material facts which need be addressed on appeal. As noted above, the 
Appellee is a health care provider which is clearly listed among the health care provisions 
of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act as outlined in the Utah Code. Further, the actions 
complained of by the Appellant occurred during the time that health care services were being 
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provided. Further the Appellant's claims are barred by the Governmental Immunity Act and 
the two year statute of limitations for a wrongful death action. For the foregoing reasons, the 
decision of the District Court granting the summary judgment should be affirmed, and this 
appeal dismissed. 
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As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages 
against a governmental entity or against an employee. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, 
servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, 
members of a board, members of a commission, or members of an 
advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 
67-5b-104, student teachers certificated in accordance with Section 
53A-6-104, educational aides, students engaged in providing services 
to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional Health care clinical training program, 
volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contrac-
tor. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection 
(2)(a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives 
compensation. 
(3) "Governmental entity".means the state and its political subdivisions 
as defined in this chapter. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, opera-
tion, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not 
the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is charac-
terized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, 
unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or 
not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be 
performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any depart-
ment, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or 
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his 
agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property 
damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, 
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or 
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, 
or interest in real or personal property. 
(9) "State" means the s tate of Utah, and includes any office, depart-
ment, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college, 
university, or other instrumentali ty of the state. 
63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit, 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of 
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted 
in either public or private facilities. 
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical 
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are 
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and 
are considered to be governmental functions: 
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician 
because of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition; 
(ii) high r isk ' care or procedures available in Utah only at a 
state-owned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physi-
cians employed at & state-owned university acting in the scope of their 
employment; 
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or 
t reatment at another medical facility in Utah; and 
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned 
university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned 
university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds 
is unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state. 
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in 
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board 
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6. 
(3) The management of flood^waters and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental 
entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury 
°r damage resulting from those activities. 
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions 
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4a. 
63-30-10- Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions-
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest , malicious prosecu-
tion, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interfer-
ence with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful* assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, 
and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, Chapter 10 
which immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law. 
78-11-7, Death of adult — Suit by heir or personal repre-
sentative [Effective until July 1, 1997]. 
Except as provided in Title 35, Chapter 1, when the death of a person not a 
minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his 
personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an action 
for damages against the person causing the death, or, if such person is 
employed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also 
against such other person. If such adult person has a guardian at the time of 
his death, only one action can be maintained for the injury to or death of such 
person, and such action may be brought by either the personal representatives 
of such adult deceased person, fqr the benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian 
for the benefit of the heirs as provided in Section 78-11-6. In every action under 
this and Section 78-11-6 such damages may be given as under all the 
circumstances of the case may be just . 
Death of adult — Suit by heir or personal 
representative [Effective July 1, 1997]. 
Except as provided in Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, 
when the death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, 
may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or, 
if such person is employed by another person who is responsible for his 
conduct, then also against such other person. If such adult person has a 
guardian at the time of his death, only one action can be maintained for the 
injury to or death of such person, and such action may be brought by either the 
personal representatives of such adult deceased person, for the benefit of his 
heirs, or by such guardian for the benefit of the heirs as provided in Section 
78-11-6. In every action under this and Section 78-11-6 such damages may be 
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just. 
An action may be brought within two years: 
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or other officer for liability 
incurred by the doing of an act in his* official capacity, and by virtue of his 
office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of 
money collected upon an execution; 
(2) for recovery of damages for a death caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another; or 
(3) in causes of action against the state and its employees, for injury to 
the personal rights of another if not otherwise provided by state or federal 
law. 
78-12-28. Within two years. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-28; L. 1971, ch. 212, § 1; 1976, 
ch. 23, § 13; 1987, ch. 19, § 3; 1996, ch. 79, 
§ 112; 1997, ch. 153, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 1997, deleted "but this 
section does not apply to an action for an 
escape" at the end of Subsection (1); in Subsec-
tion (3) added "in causes of action against the 
state and its employees'' and substituted "if not 
78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence act ion. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless 
and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or 
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
Such notice shall include a general s ta tement of the na ture of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances 
thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the par t of the prospective 
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. 
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his 
attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the 
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the 
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the 
date of mailing. Such n&tice shall be served within the time allowed for 
commencing a malpractice action against a health care provider. If the notice 
is served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time 
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care 
provider shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service of notice. 
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be 
construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, 
and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This 
section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. 
M. DAYLE JEFFS, #1655 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878 
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COUNTY and MILFORD 
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a 
governmental agency of BEAVER COUNTY, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 98-CV-56 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, by and through 
counsel, and moves the court to dismiss the plaintiffs Complaint. 
FACTS 
1. Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital is the operating name of the 
hospital owned by the Beaver County Special Hospital Service District No. 3 and is a 
political subdivision of Beaver County doing business as a health care provider within Beaver 
County, Utah. 
2. The Milford Valley Memorial Hospital Ambulance Service is owned and 
operated by Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital. (See Affidavit of John Gledhill 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A".) 
3. Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital (known as "Beaver County 
Special Hospital Service District No. 3") was duly created as a separate body politic under 
the Utah Special Service District Act, U.C.A. §§ 17A-2-1301, et. seq. (See Exhibit "B"). 
4. Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital is licensed as a "General Acute 
Hospital" pursuant to § 26-21-2 (See Exhibit "C"). 
5. Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital performs duties related to 
general hospital care and professional services in Beaver County, State of Utah. 
6. The incident in question took place in Beaver County, Utah. 
7. On October 8, 1995, the decedent, Mrs. Carter, became ill and distressed to 
the point that Plaintiff called for emergency assistance from the Milford Valley Memorial 
Hospital. An ambulance was dispatched promptly. Upon arrival, the ambulance personnel 
placed Mrs. Carter in the ambulance and began their journey to the Beaver Valley Hospital, 
located in Beaver, Utah. En route, the driver noticed one of the gauges operating in an 
erratic fashion. Being concerned he called the Hospital and requested that they send a 
second ambulance in case he suffered a breakdown. The ambulance did not break down. 
When the ambulances met, as a safety precaution, they transferred Mrs. Carter to the Beaver 
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Hospital Ambulance and then continued with Mrs. Carter to the Hospital. Downtime for the 
change of ambulance was no more than one minute. Mrs. Carter died on October 17, 1995. 
8. Plaintiff waited until January 6, 1998, to file the Complaint for this action, 
nearly two and one third years after the incident in question occurred. 
9. Plaintiff alleges negligence on the part of Defendant which allegedly led to the 
death of Mrs. Carter. 
ARGUMENT 
Under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may grant any 
parties' Motion for Summary Judgment so long as the moving party shows "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Furthermore, the court must view all evidence, admissions, and inferences 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (Utah 1960). 
A. Utah Health Care Malpractice Act Applies. 
Section 78-14-2 has recognized that "the number of suits and claims for damages and 
the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in 
recent years." As a result, the costs of health care have risen dramatically: "The effect of 
increased insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost, both 
through the health care prdviders passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the 
provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary 
3 
in a lawsuit." § 78-14-2 states that the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is 
to "provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care 
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability 
insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated." Through this section, the 
Utah Legislature has announced its desire to specifically protect health care providers from 
having to concern themselves with long periods of time in which their potential liability is 
unknown, thus hopefully bringing down the costs of being a health care provider. Title 78 
Chapter 14 sets forth the required steps that must be taken in order for a party to present a 
legitimate claim against a health care provider. If, then, a potential Defendant meets the 
definition of a health care provider as provided for in § 78-14-3, a party seeking suit against 
that health care provider must meet all of these requirements or their claim will be barred. § 
78-14-3(14) defines a "malpractice action against a health care provider" as u[a]ny action 
against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, 
or otherwise . . . ." (emphasis added). In addition, § 78-14-3(11) defines "health care 
provider" as "any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other facility or institution 
who causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital . 
. . or others rendering similar care and services relating to or arising out of the health needs 
of persons or groups of persons and officers, employees or agents of any of the above acting 
in the course or scope of their employment" (Emphasis added). There are two parts to this 
definition. Under the first part, § 78-14-4(12) defines "hospital" as "a public or private 
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institution licensed under Title 26, Chapter 21, Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspection 
Act." As stated in the facts portion of this Motion, Defendant is licensed as a "General 
Acute Hospital" pursuant to § 26-21-13. Thus, since Defendant is licensed as a "General 
Acute Hospital," they are a "hospital" pursuant to § 78-14-4(12). Since they are a hospital, 
and since they render "health care or professional services" (See Facts Portion of this Motion 
Para. 5) they meet the definition of^ a health care provider. The service being provided was 
ambulance service arising out of the health care needs of the patient. Thus, the ambulance 
service is a health care provider under § 78-14-3(1). Finally, since they are a health care 
provider, and since this claim is for wrongful death, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
applies to this case. Under the second part, since the Milford Valley Memorial Hospital 
Ambulance Service, as agents for the Defendants, performed the service that allegedly was 
negligent, and since they were, at the time of the incident, "acting in the course or scope of 
their employment," pursuant to § 78-14-4(11) the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act applies. 
In either case, because § 78-14-4(11) uses the conjunction "or" rather than "and" to separate 
the two parts of the definition, this Act applies to this suit if either of the two parts part 
apply. 
1. Plaintiff's Claims Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act Barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1). 
Pursuant to § 78-14-4(1) the statute of limitations for any malpractice action against a 
health care provider is two years. As before stated, defendant meets the requirements of a 
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"health care provider." Thus, since Plaintiff brought suit against Milford Valley Memorial 
Hospital, a health care provider under § 78-14-3(11), and since the alleged wrongdoing 
occurred through the use of the Milford Valley Memorial Hospital Ambulance (being a 
service of the Defendant), the statute of limitations as set forth in § 78-14-4(1) applies. The 
next question then is whether the Plaintiff brought his action within the requisite two-year 
period. The Medical Malpractice Act statute of limitations begins to run "from the time the 
'plaintiff or patient' discovers or 'should have discovered' the injury." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 
P.2d 574 (Utah 1993). In addition, The Utah Supreme Court has held that "the point at 
which a person reasonably should know that he or she has suffered a legal injury is a 
question of fact." Andreini v. Hultgren, 869 P.2d 919 (1993). In the case at bar, Plaintiff 
alleges that the incident that is the heart of this action occurred on October 8, 1995 
(Complaint at 2). No other facts have been alleged by the Plaintiff that would indicate that 
he was unaware of the claimed legal injury at that time. As such, the statute of limitations 
on this matter began to run on October 8, 1995. Defendants did not file this suit until 
January 6, 1998, nearly two and one third years after the statute of limitations began to run. 
Since Plaintiff waited too long to file this action, under § 78-14-4(1) their claim is barred. 
They had until October 9, 1997 to file this claim. The action was not timely filed. 
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2. Plaintiff's Claims Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act Barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-14-8. 
Section 78-14-8 requires that "[n]o malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor 
or successor, at least 90 days' prior notice of intent to commence an action." Provided, 
however, if the notice of intent to commence an action is given in the last 90 days, the 
statute of limitations is extended 120 days. In other words, if the party files their notice of 
intent to sue within the 90-day period immediately preceding the expiration of the two-year 
statute of limitations period, they will be granted a 120-day grace period in which they can 
file suit. 
Again, as before stated, Defendant meets the definition of "health care provider" as 
found in § 78-14-3(11). As a result, Plaintiff was required to give notice of intent to sue to 
Defendant, under the Malpractice Act, at least 90 days prior to the initiation of this law suit 
and before the end of the two-year statute of limitations period. In October of 1996, plaintiff 
filed a Notice of Claim under the Governmental Immunity Act. Even though this Notice of 
Claim is not the same procedurally as the notice of intent to sue, if the Court deems it as a 
notice of intent to commence an action for purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, Plaintiff is still unable to avail himself of § 78-14-8's 120-day extension. As before 
stated, the Notice of Claim was filed in October of 1996, one year prior to the last day of the 
two-year statute of limitations. Since the 120-day extension applies only where the Notice 
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was filed within the last 90 days of such date, Plaintiff is unable to take advantage of this 
grace period. 
Since Plaintiff, to date, has neglected to file a notice of intent to sue under the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act, they have not complied with § 78-14-8 and, thus, their claim 
under § 78-14-8 should be barred. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 1997 WL 613002. 
In the alternative, even if this court finds that the October 1996 Notice of Claim acts as a 
notice of intent under the Malpractice Act § 78-14-8, plaintiff is bound by said requirement 
and statute of limitations. Plaintiff still cannot use the 120-day extension granted to those 
who file the notice of intent because he did not file the notice of intent during the 90 days 
leading up to the end of the two-year statute if limitations period. As such, on the last day 
of the two-year period (October 9, 1997) Plaintiff's claim was barred under § 78-14-8. 
B. Utah Governmental Immunity Act Applies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) states that "all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a . . . governmentally owned hospital . 
. . or other governmental health care facility . . . ." The term "governmental entity" is 
defined in § 63-30-2(3) as "the state and its political subdivisions as defined in this chapter." 
§ 63-30-2(7) then defines a "political subdivision" as "any county, city, town . . . or other 
governmental subdivision or public corporation." In addition, as stated in the Facts portion 
of this Motion, Beaver County Special Hospital Service District No. 3, doing business as 
Milford Valley Memorial Hospital, is a political subdivision of Beaver County, State of 
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Utah. Since Defendant meets the definition of a governmental entity, and since they are 
governmentally owned, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, found in Title 63, Chapter 30 
of the Utah Code applies to this case. 
/ . Plaintiff's Claims under the Utah Governmental Immunity are barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15). 
Subparagraph (15) of § 63-30-10 states that no waiver of immunity exists where "the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the operation of an emergency 
vehicle" while the emergency vehicle is being driven within the parameters of § 41-6-14 
(traffic law exceptions for emergency vehicles). In other words, under § 63-30-10(15) the 
state has not waived sovereign immunity in cases where a claim for relief is based on injuries 
resulting from the use of an emergency vehicle unless it can be shown that they were guilty 
of some traffic violation as outlined in § 41-6-14. Plaintiff has made no such assertion. In 
his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he death of the decedent was a direct and proximate 
result of the delay in transporting her to the Beaver Valley Hospital." (Plaintiffs Complaint 
at 2). This, Plaintiff claims, was the result of unnecessary and negligent delay caused by 
Defendant's "[fjailure to keep the ambulance in proper and maintenance [sic] and repair so 
that it could complete the trip to Beaver Valley Hospital." (Complaint at 3). Nowhere in 
his allegations does Plaintiff claim that Defendant violated any of the traffic laws as outlined 
in § 41-6-14. As a result, Plaintiffs allegations are irrelevant as the state has not waived 
governmental immunity under Subparagraph (15) of § 63-30-10 of the Utah Code. The Utah 
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Supreme Court has upheld the validity of this Paragraph in Day v. Utah Dept. of Safety, 882 
P.2d 1150, fn 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
2. Plaintiff's Claims under the Utah Governmental immunity are barred by Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10(4). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 allows for a waiver of governmental immunity where an 
s 111111 pioximately caused by a negligent act or omission ot an employee [has been] 
committed within the scope of employment . . . ." The rest of the Section states that this 
general iiili i >ub|< u fn M H HII t \ceptions including an exception for "a failure to make an 
inspection or . . . making an inadequate or negligent inspection." Plaintiff, in his 
Complaint, alleges that "[t]he death of the decedent was a direct and proximate result of the 
delay in transporting her to the Beaver Valley Hospital." (Plaintiffs Complaint at 2). This, 
Plaintiff claims, was the result of unnecessary and negligent delay caused by Defendant's 
"[fjailure to keep the ambulance in proper and maintenance [sic] and repair so that it could 
complete the trip to Beaver Valley Hospital." (Complaint at 3). In other words, Plaintiff 
alleges thai Mn mimics were caused due to faulty inspections performed I \ ilit I u ft ml int. 
Plaintiff essentially alleges that but for a faulty inspection, the injury would not have 
occurred. However, Plaintiffs allegations are irrelevant due to the fact that Defendant has 
not waived their governmental immunity under § 63-30-10(4) of the Utah Code. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the policy behind the exceptions to 
waiver of immunity that are found in § 63-30-10 are based upon the public interest: "Far 
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more persons would suffer if government did not perform these functions than would be 
benefitted by permitting recovery in cases where the government is shown to have performed 
inadequately, [quoting from 4 California Law Revision Commission, Reports, 
Recommendations and Studies 817-18 (1963)]." Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 
995, 998 (I Itah 1993). As such, they held that § 63-30-10(4) "was intended to immunize only 
the conclusions and results of an inspection where the inspector may have overlooked 
something or made a faulty judgment in deciding whether to approve or reject the subject of 
the inspection." Id. Plaintiffs claim that decedent's death was caused by faulty inspections is 
barred by § 63-30-10(4) for the reason that the state has not waived sovereign immunity for 
such claim. 
C. Plaintiffs Claims Under the General Statute of Limitations for Wrongful Death 
are Barred by Utah Code Ann §78-12-28(2) and § 78-11-7. 
Although the statute allowing for a wrongful death suit is found in § 78-11-7, any 
such suits "caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another" fall under the general two year 
statute of limitations found in U.C.A. § 78-12-28(2). However, in a recent Utah Supreme 
Court case, a case factually similar to the case at bar, it was held that the two year statute of 
limitations as set forth in Title 78 Chapter 14 (the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act) was 
applicable to an action for malpractice against a health care provider rather than the general 
two year statute of limitations that is found in Chapter 12: "Clearly, the legislature intended 
that the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act apply to actions for wrongful death based upon 
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personal injuries arising out of medical malpractice." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 1997 WL 
155086 at 4. Even so, under the general § 78-12-28(2) statute of limitations Plaintiffs suit 
still fails as it was not timely filed. As before stated, Plaintiff has neglected to initiate this 
action prior to the termination of the two year period. As such, he cannot assert his claim 
under the general wrongful death statute. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Plaintiffs claims are barred. Any one of Defendant's 
affirmative defenses is sufficient grounds for this court to grant summary judgment. Since all 
of Defendant's defenses are based upon and supported by existing law as set forth in the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act and the Governmental Immunity Act, as well as U.C.A. § 78-12-
28(2)'s two-year wrongful death statute of limitations, this court should grant this Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismiss Plaintiffs claims in their entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this £/^-L day of May, 1998. 
<&. / j / ^ 
M. Dayle Jeffs r? 
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M. DAYLE JEFFS, #1655 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAX R. CARTER, | 
Plaintiff, i AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN GLEDHILL 
vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY and MILFORD 
VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a 
governmental agency of BEAVER COUNTY, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF BEAVER ) 
John Gledhill, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the administrator of Milford Valley Memorial Hospital. 
2. I am acquainted with the ambulance service of Milford Valley Memorial Hospital 
including the emergency vehicles. 
Civil No. 980500005 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
3. The ambulance service of Milford Valley Memorial Hospital is operated by 
Milford Valley Memorial Hospital and the vehicles are owned by the Beaver County Special 
Hospital Service District No. 3. 
4. Milford Valley Memorial Hospital is the operating business name of the hospital 
which is owned by the Beaver County Special Hospital Service District No. 3. 
5. The ambulances and the ambulance service is neither owned or operated by 
Beaver County ^ 
DATED and signed this J ^ f day of F^rx^**^, 1998. 
.^fohn Gledhill, Administrator 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this > 7 day of FZ-^r^-u ^_L9-98. 
yRu/Afkir^^--
Notary Public i>oiary ruonc / / i » 
Residing at (T\A U W . Ik Sk JA. 
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RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH BEAVER COUNTY 
SPECIAL HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 3. 
BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of County Commissioners of Beaver 
County, State of Utah, that: 
SECTION 1. The Board of County Commissioners of Beaver County, 
Utah, hereby find and declare that the public health, convenience 
and necessity require that a special hospital service district be 
established to include the territory hereinafter described and to 
provide the service hereinafter specified pursuant to the provisions 
of Chapter 23 of Title 11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
known and cited as the Utah Special Service District Act. Proceedings 
for the creation, of such special service district are hereby commenced 
pursuant to Section 11-23-5(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
SECTION 2. The name of such special service district shall be 
Beaver County Special Hospital Service District No. 3. 
SECTION 3. The service to be provided by such special service 
district shall be hospital service. 
SECTION 4. The territory to be included in said special service 
district shall consist of the following, to-wit: 
All that portion of said Beaver County lying West of the 
following line: Commencing at a point where the range 
line dividing Range 8 West and Range 9 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, intersects the Beaver-Millard county 
line, and running thence South along said range line to 
the Southeast corner of Section 36, Township 29 South, 
Range 9 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 
4 miles to the Northwest corner of Section 4. Township 
30 South, Range 9 West; thence South to the Leaver-Iron 
County line. 
SECTION 5. As the whole of the municipalities of Milford City 
and Minersville Town is contained within the territory intended to 
be included in said special service district', the governing body of 
each of said municipalities is hereby requested to adopt a resolu-
tion or ordinance consenting to tne inclusion of said municipality 
in said special service district pursuant to Section 11-23-4(2)(b). 
SECTION 6. The governing body of the existing Beaver County 
Service Area No. Two, (which is a service area organized and existing 
under the former law governing county service areas), has elected 
that the said Beaver County Service Area No. Two become a special 
Page 2. 
service district pursuant to the provisions of Section 11-23-28, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the service being provided by the said 
Beaver County Service Area No. Two, to-wit, hospital service, being 
the same as the service to be provided by the anticipated special 
service district, and the territory described in Section 4 hereof, 
as the territory intended to be included within the proposed Beaver 
County Special Hospital Service District No. 3, including all of the 
area now constituting the said Beaver County Service Area No. Two. 
SECTION 7. When the Board of County Commissioners shall have 
set a time and place for a public hearing on the question of whether 
or not said special service district shall be created as required 
by^  Section 11-23-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, then the 
Beaver County Clerk is directed to issue and publish notice thereof 
and of the intention of said Board of County Commissioners to create 
such district in the manner provided by Sections 11-23-7 and 11-23-8. 
ADOPTED this 1st day of July, 1982. 
Chad W. Johnson 
Chairman 
'dr^ 
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CITY OF MILFORD 
N2 2 2 9 3 BEAVER COUNTY, UTAH 
BUSINESS LICENSE 
GRANTED TO MILFORD VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL ( MILFORD VALLEY MEMORIAL CLINIC) 
To Carry On the Business of HOSPITAL & MEDICAL OFFICE 
At 451 NORTH MAIN STREET MILFORD, UTAH 
For a Period of 12 Months, Commencing JULY l , 1996 
and Ending JUNE 3 0 , 1997 
THIS LICENSE granted subject to the provisions of the Ordinances of the City of Milford, Utah, 
and subsequent amendments relating to business license. 
FEE $ 50.00 (FTFTY AND OO/IOO Dollars) 
Given under my hand and the Seal of the City of 
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FLOYD W HOLM (1522) 
965 South Main, Suite 6 
P.O. Box 765 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-6532 
Fax: (801) 586-3879 
FIFTH JUDICIAL COURT, IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAX R CARTER, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V. J 
BEAVER COUNTY and MILFORD ] 
VALLEY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a ] 




\ Case No. 
Plaintiff, for cause of cause of action against Defendants, alleges as follows: 
1. Defendant Beaver County is a political subdivision organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Milford Valley Memorial Hospital is an agency or subdivision of 
Beaver County doing business as a medical provider within Beaver County, Utah. 
3. The acts and incident complained of herein took place in Beaver County, Utah. 
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4. Venue is proper in Iron County, Utah, pursuant to §63-30-17, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that Iron County is contiguous to Beaver County, one of the 
Defendants herein. Plaintiff has applied for and/or will receive leave of the Court for venue in 
Iron County. 
5. At all times pertinent herein, in doing or omitting the things herein alleged, the 
officers, employees or agents of Defendants were acting within the course and scope of their 
employment or agency and with the permission or consent of Defendants. 
6. Plaintiff is the widower and sole heir of Anna Rae Carter (the "decedent"), 
who died on October 17, 1995. 
7. On or about October 8, 1995, the decedent became ill and distressed to the 
extent that Plaintiff called for emergency assistance from the Beaver County Ambulance, which is 
owned and operated by Defendants. The ambulance personnel obtained the decedent and began 
transporting her to Beaver Valley Hospital in Beaver, Utah. En route to the hospital, the 
ambulance broke down and another ambulance had to be called from Beaver to complete the trip, 
resulting in a delay of approximately twenty (20) minutes. Shortly before arriving at the hospital, 
the decedent lost consciousness and went into arrest. Although the decedent was revived after 
some forty (40) minutes, she never regained brain activity and died on October 17, 1995. 
8. The death of the decedent was a direct and proximate result of the delay in 
transporting her to the Beaver Valley Hospital. 
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9. The Defendant, by and through its employees and agents, were negligent in the 
following particulars: 
(a) Failure to keep the initial ambulance in proper and maintenance and 
repair so that it could complete the trip to Beaver Valley Hospital; 
(b) Failure to timely replace the initial ambulance with a better functioning 
ambulance prior to the incidents of October 8, 1995; and 
(c) Such other acts of negligence as may be shown at the time of trial. 
10. The negligent acts of Defendants, by and through their officers, employees or 
agents, are the sole and proximate cause of the decedentfs death and Plaintiffs injuries. 
11. By reason of the negligent conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff 
has suffered a loss of love, companionship, society, consortium, support and association of the 
decedent. 
12. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff has 
been damaged generally in an amount to be shown at trial. 
13. As a result of the acts of Defendants, Plaintiffhas incurred additional expenses 
for the last illness of the decedent as well as funeral, burial and related expenses, all of which are 
special damages, in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
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14. Pursuant to §78-27-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Plaintiffis 
entitled to interest on all special damages incurred by him at the rate of eight per cent (8%) per 
annum from October 8, 1995, to the date of judgment herein. 
15. On October 7,1996, Plaintiff caused to be executed a Notice of Claim, based 
upon the allegations herein, to Defendants. Said Notice of Claim was served upon the above 
entity or about October 8, 1996. 
16. The Notice of Claim was not acted upon by Defendants within ninety (90) 
days of service upon it and, therefore, was deemed denied as of January 8, 1997. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, 
jointly and severally, as follows: 
1. For special damages, including medical expenses of the last illness of the 
decedent and burial expenses, together with interest thereon, as may be determined by the Court 
at the time of trial; 
2. For general damages as may be determined at the Court at the time of trial; 
3. For cost of this action; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper, 
4*t DATED this <>~ day of January, 1998. 
FLOYD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Address of Plaintiff: 
P.O. Box 86 
Minersville, UT 84752 
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